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Abstract  
Intuitive systems are usable systems. Design guidelines advocate intuitiveness and vendors claim it – 
but what does it mean for a user interface, interactive system or device to be intuitive? A review of the 
use of the term “intuitive” indicates that it has two distinct but overlapping meanings, namely 
intuitiveness based on familiarity and intuitiveness reflecting our embodiment (and frequently both). 
While everyday usage indicates that familiarity means either a passing acquaintance or an intimacy 
with something or someone, it will be concluded that familiarity might best be equated with “know-
how” which in turn is based on a deep, often tacit, understanding. The intuitive nature of tangible user 
interfaces will in turn be attributed to embodiment rather than tangibility per se. Merleau-Ponty writes 
that it is through our bodies that we “prehend” the world. A number of disciplines now regard action-
perception as so closely coupled that they are better considered as a dyad rather than separately. A 
modified treatment of action-perception coupling is proposed, with familiarity providing an epistemic 
core, as the basis of intuitiveness. 
 
Keywords: intuitiveness, familiarity, embodiment, action-perception coupling, affordance. 
1 Introduction 
This paper examines one of the most fundamental, most desirable of attributes of human-computer 
interaction (HCI) namely it should be intuitive. For many years design guidelines have recommended 
that systems should be created so that their use is intuitive. This has been interpreted as ease to use, or 
ease of learning, being consistent or being familiar, in taking advantage of existing skills and 
knowledge; or employ something familiar from the real world by way of a metaphor (e.g. Bewley et 
al., 1983; Shneiderman, 1992; Hartson and Hix, 1993; Raskin, 1994) among very many others). For 
almost as many years designers and vendors have promoted their systems and devices as being 
intuitive. Yet for a concept which lies at the heart of interaction design, HCI is remarkably vague on 
agreeing what is meant by intuitiveness, how it works and just how many aspects of interaction 
intuitiveness represents. For example, when we describe the use of the desktop metaphor and the use 
of a joystick as being intuitive are we describing the same attribute?  
In everyday usage, intuitive means automatic or without requiring conscious thought, there is also a 
suggestion of the visceral (“gut feeling”). Intuitiveness, by definition arises from our intuitive 
faculties, or intuition, which women are said to have in abundance, again implying (pejoratively) the 
affective rather than rational. Perhaps the most frequently cited aspect of intuition is an individual’s 
sense of what is right or wrong and of making an appropriate or inappropriate response in a given 
context while largely remaining ignorant of the reasons for that mental state (Westcott, 1968). Finally, 
in the Dreyfus and Dreyfus model of skill acquisition (1988) intuitiveness is attributed to their highest 
level of achievement, namely, that of expert. An expert is someone who, paradoxically, no longer 
relies on rules or guidelines and has an intuitive grasp of situations based on deep tacit understanding. 
1.1 The Marketing of Games Consoles 
It is worth taking a moment to consider the origin of the current discussion which was prompted by a 
number of reviews of the new generation of games consoles which are currently being promoted by 
their respective manufacturers. 
At the time of writing, three major vendors are actively promoting their new games consoles. 
Microsoft was first on the market with Xbox 360 with its impressive graphics and sound capabilities; 
Sony’s PS3 also boasts impressive graphics and sound; while Nintendo’s Wii (with its impressive 
graphics and sound) has a pair of controllers (input devices) described as the “Wii-mote control” and 
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the “nunchuck” (which will not be discussed further). Images of the Wii-mote control can be seen 
below in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: the Nintendo Wii-mote control (www.nintendo.com)  
Reviewers have noted that this device is particularly intuitive. As can be seen from the figure, it looks 
like a TV remote control (hence, I assume, its name) which wirelessly communicates with the games 
console. It also has internal and external sensors which detect its movement and orientation so that in 
addition to using it as a pointing device it can also be used as a ‘baseball bat’, a ‘sword’ or a ‘tennis 
racket’. Figure 2 illustrates a game of baseball being played on the Nintendo Wii with the player using 
the Wii-mote control as though it was a baseball bat. 
 
 
Figure 2: the Nintendo Wii-mote control in action (www.nintendo.com) 
Thus the Wii-mote control offers a style of interaction which is both familiar and tangible. It looks and 
behaves like a familiar TV remote control while also offering a tangible style of interaction. 
1.2 The structure of this paper 
The argument presented here is an attempt to “deconstruct” the concept of intuitiveness. The term 
intuitive is used in many different ways in HCI but there are two distinct groupings which correspond 
to intuitiveness as familiarity and intuitiveness as embodiment. Familiarity and embodiment are then 
considered from successive HCI, philosophical and psychological perspectives. In these discussions to 
recurrent themes emerge namely, perception and affordance. It is concluded that intuitiveness can be 
described in terms of a modified account of action-perception coupling. 
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2 Two Views of Intuitiveness 
2.1 Intuitiveness and Familiarity 
From an HCI perspective, Raskin (1994) has famously argued that to be intuitive means to be familiar. 
He writes that a user interface is intuitive in as it much as it resembles (or is identical) to something 
the user already knows. He continues, “In short, intuitive in this context is an almost exact synonym of 
familiar”. Later, and at greater length, he writes “one of the most laudatory terms used to describe an 
interface is to say that it is intuitive. When examined closely, this concept turns out to vanish like a pea 
in a shell game and be replaced with the more ordinary but more accurate term familiar” (Raskin, 
2000). Similarly Kara et al. (1997) have also posed the question “Are what we call "intuitive" user 
interfaces really just familiar user interfaces?” There numerous design guidelines which echo this 
directing the HCI specialist to make use of the familiar and to date this has been achieved by way of 
the wide spread use of metaphor, the most familiar of which is the desktop metaphor. 
In our everyday lives we acquire knowledge of a real world desktops and have found that they support 
a large number of activities such as placing things on them, sitting at them, working at them and so 
forth - in other words we have directly perceived their affordances. But this is essentially a reciprocal 
relationship whereby our perception of objects’ affordances makes us familiar with them and our very 
familiarity allows us to perceive their affordances. Such knowledge is by definition intuitive, however 
to make use of it when using an interactive device requires us to make inferences from these 
intuitions1. Thomson, in discussing the relative merits and status of intuitive and inferential 
knowledge, observes:  
 
“Intuition and Inference usually are contrasted with each other as being two separate and 
antithetical modes of mental experience. Intuition is generally referred to as primary and 
fundamental, while Inference is accounted secondary and superstructive. But as far as one has 
been made dependent upon the other, mankind has been disposed to measure Inference by 
Intuition rather than Intuition by Inference. Intuition has been regarded as a source of or 
method of obtaining transcendental, pure and trustworthy knowledge; while Inference has 
been esteemed to yield only experiential, mixed and uncertain information. ”  
1878: 339 (capitalisation in the original)  
Thus the creators of the desktop metaphor assumed that people could make inferences about the 
behaviour of the computer-based desktop from their (intuitive) knowledge of real desktops. Metaphor 
is more pervasive in HCI than may be at first sight is apparent – consider the ubiquity of “cut and 
paste” and reference to web “pages”. The Xerox Star was not only the first system to employ the 
desktop metaphor but the first to use toolbox metaphor (e.g. Johnson et al., 1989) but elsewhere more 
exotic metaphors such as magic wands (e.g. Bowman et al., 2001); breadcrumbs (e.g. Darken and 
Silbert, 1993); muddy footprints (e.g. Marcus, 1993) among dozens of other have been employed to 
communicate the designers’ intent to the systems’ users. 
A great deal has been written about the role of metaphor in HCI and space does not permit an 
extended discussion of this, safe to say that its advocates claim that it reflects the very basis of our 
cognition (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Fauconnier and Turner, 2003) while others advise caution 
and regard it potentially harmful (Halasz and Moran, 1982). However Holyoak and Thagard (1995) 
have convincing argued for the mechanism by which metaphor and analogy operate. They describe 
metaphor as involving saying one thing in order to say another. A metaphor thus connects two 
different domains just as an analogy works by mapping a ‘source’ and a ‘target’. Thus metaphor and 
analogy can connect, in the minds of the users, real world objects with corresponding elements and 
attributes of interactive devices hence the power of familiar source domains.  
                                                      
1 Norman (1988), who introduced the concept of affordance to HCI, sought to adapt the original, direct unlearned formulation 
with one which is at one remove, namely perceived affordance. He suggested that an individual could be said to perceive the 
intended behaviour of, say, interface widgets such as the sliders and buttons. The intended and perceived behaviours of such 
widgets are, of course, very simple, including sliding, pressing and rotating leaving him to conclude that ‘real affordances are 
not nearly as important as perceived affordances; it is perceived affordances that tell the user what actions can be performed 
on an object and, to some extent, how to do them’ (ibid). Like Gibson, however, he subsequently modified his position on 
user interface affordances to observe that they are ‘often more about conventions than about reality’ (Norman, 1999:124). 
  To appear in Behaviour and Information Technology 
 4 
2.2 Familiarity 
Familiarity means a thorough knowledge of, or an intimacy with something or someone. 
Etymologically it is related to family. Familiarity is commonplace and everyday and aside from 
familiarity as intimacy, it can also be used to indicate a passing acquaintance. For example, my train to 
work has an automated announcement asking passengers to familiarise themselves with the safety 
procedures. Yet familiarity, in either sense, has not received sustained attention in the field of human 
computer interaction excepting perhaps some of our recent work (Van De Walle et al., 2003; Turner et 
al., 2004). In an attempted to define it more clearly we have turned to the work of Martin Heidegger 
who discussed it at some length2. Heidegger is best known for his hyphenated treatment of our being-
in-the-world, which for him, captures the fundamental questions of ontology. For Heidegger, to exist 
is to be in the world (better thought of a social world rather than planet Earth as such) and his use of 
hyphens indicates that we are not and cannot be separated from this fact. Heidegger has argued that 
familiarity is a consequence of being-in-the-world and is the basis of our worldliness, that is, our 
ability to deal with the world. In short, we are able to cope with the world and the systems it comprises 
because we are familiarity with it.  
Familiarity encompasses the ideas of involvement and understanding. Involvement may be thought of 
as an expansion of the word in as found in ‘being-in-the-world’ while understanding should be 
interpreted as ‘know-how’. Dreyfus (1991) notes that “This know-how … is more basic than the 
distinction between thought and action” and directly equates humans with these skills (“We are such 
skills”). In these terms, being familiar with a computer should be understood in terms of being able 
use it or better still being able to cope with it. Coping, in turn, may be understood in terms of three key 
characteristics, firstly, it is the recognition that equipment is inter-related. Each piece of equipment 
being used for a specific task – hammers are for driving nails into wood; a word processor is used to 
compose text. The second ‘component’ of the world is the set of purposes to which these tasks are put. 
Of course, while we cannot meaningfully separate out purposes from tasks in these worlds we can 
recognize that the word processor is used to write an academic paper for the purpose of publication 
and dissemination. Nails are driven into wood to provide illustrations for philosophical discourse. 
Finally, in performing these tasks we acquire or assume an identity (or identities) as carpenters, 
academics and so forth. In adopting these concepts and perspectives we are move away from 
reflecting on the nature of things to how we use, manage and cope with them. Thus we demonstrate 
our familiarity with the world by coping with situations, tools and objects. Familiarity is then a 
‘readiness’ to cope with, say, chairs (e.g. by sitting on them and by being able to sit in them) which 
has developed from our earliest days. Heidegger describes this readiness as “the background of … 
primary familiarity, which itself is not conscious or intended but is rather present in [an] unprominent 
way” (Heidegger, 1985: 189). Thus, assuming that we are in the world of modern computing, when 
we enter our places of work we see desks, chairs, computers, printers, network points and so forth. We 
do not perceive a jumble of surfaces, wires and inexplicable grey boxes. Having made a case for 
familiarity how do we re-cast this into an account which might reveal how this works in practice? 
The question then, is what is the psychological basis of familiarity? From what we have seen it does 
not appear to involve a cognitive representation and the manipulation of that knowledge in a way 
congruent with a mental model. Instead it appears to resemble the way in which an expert chess 
master player perceives patterns of pieces which the novice cannot (e.g. Chase and Simon, 1973); or 
way in which an academic is about to locate themselves in the information space offered by a journal 
paper more accurately than the less experienced reader (e.g. Dillon and Scaap, 1996) or the tennis pro 
being able to predict the direction of an opponent’s serve better than a novice (e.g. Farrow and 
Abernethy, 2003). So perhaps familiarity may be better understood as changes in perception rather 
than the creation of knowledge per se. Our own work lends weight to this hypothesis (e.g. Van De 
Walle et al., 2003; Turner et al., 2004). In a longitudinal study of seniors learning to use a PC we 
found evidence for changes in their perceptions of interactive technology accompanying their growing 
familiarity with it. We witnessed changes in their perception of information technologies from, for 
example, something quite alien to a means of warding off or at least delaying many of the effects of 
aging (loss of mobility, contact with the outside world, communications with friends and relatives).  
                                                      
2 It should be noted that Heidegger was also an unrepentant member of the Nazi party a fact which should not be neglected 
when consulting his work. 
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So, for the purposes of this discussion this perspective on intuitiveness will be subsumed under the 
single term “intuitiveness as familiarity”. 
2.3 Intuitiveness and Embodiment 
However there is more to intuitiveness than just know-how or familiarity. There are many researchers 
who describe their interactive systems as intuitive but emphasize their graspability, physicality and 
tangibility. Such system often employ a tangible user interface (TUI). Ishii and Ullmer (1997) 
introduced us to their vision of “Tangible Bits” which has subsequently formed a focus of subsequent 
research into tangible and ambient computing. An important feature of this is the “grasp and 
manipulate” approach which couples everyday physical objects and surfaces and corresponding digital 
representations. Since this initial work, tangible systems have appeared two broad forms, namely, 
those which employ some form of interactive workbench and those which are more “free-standing”. 
Of the former group, Bricks (Fitzmaurice et al., 1995), Urp (Underkoffler and Ishii, 1999) and 
Illuminating Clay (Piper et al., 2002) are prominent examples. TUIs couple physical representations 
with digital representations creating interactive systems that are computationally mediated but 
generally not identifiable as ‘computers’ per se.  
TUIs make use of physical representations – such as modelling clay (as in Piper et al. above) and 
physical drawing boards to manipulate their digital equivalents. TUIs integrate representation and 
control which GUIs necessarily keep distinct. GUIs have a Model – View – Control structure which 
involves the use peripheral devices to control a digital representation of what we are working with the 
results of which are displayed on an output device. TUIs, in contrast, employ a MCRpd model in 
which the view component is split between Rep-p (physical representation) and Rep-d (digital 
representation). This model highlights the tight linkage between the control and physical 
representation.  
A second larger group of tangible systems and devices are very diverse and include examples of 
games and toys (e.g. Cheok et al., 2002; Bonanni, et al. 2006), storytelling applications (Zhou et al., 
2004) artistic applications and installations (e.g. Baxter et al. 2001; Sengers et al., 2002) among many 
more. There are also numerous example of systems described as intuitive which make reference to 
both familiarity and tangibility. For example, Mackay et al. (1998) describe an augmented reality 
(AR) prototype designed to support air traffic controllers and their interactions with paper flight strips. 
Flight strips are physical cards which contain aircraft flight information and are used by flight 
controllers to track their movement in a manner which is directly analogous to the movement of the 
aircraft themselves. By adopting an AR approach, Mackay and her colleagues sought to avoid the 
problem of “forcing an abrupt change in the controllers’ familiar styles of interaction.”  
Kasabach et al. (1998) have reported the development of digital ink. Digital Ink is described as a 
writing tool that “both understands people’s handwriting, and allows them to turn any writing surface 
into a personalized interaction surface”. Its creators note that its use is intuitive it that it is based on 
something familiar - a pen, which of course is also a tangible artefact. In all, this points to intuitiveness 
reflecting our embodied.  
Whitehead writing in his Science and the Modern World observed that “We have to admit that the 
body is the organism whose states regulate our cognition of the world. The unity of the perceptual 
field therefore must be a unity of bodily experience” (Whitehead, 1925: 91). This theme was then 
significantly developed by Merleau-Ponty who argued that it is only though our lived bodies do we 
have access to what he describes as the “primary world”. The world and the lived body together form 
an intentional arc which binds the body to the world. This arc anchors us in and to the world. The 
intentional arc is the knowledge of how to act in a way that “coheres” with one’s environment 
bringing body and world together. “The life of consciousness - cognitive life, the life of desire or 
perceptual life - is subtended by an “intentional arc” which projects round about us our past, our 
future, our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral situation” (ibid: 136). For Merleau-
Ponty the intentional arc embodies the interconnection of skilful action and perception. Commenting 
on this Dreyfus (1996) argues that we need to distinguish three different interpretations of 
embodiment. The first perspective is to recognise the physical dimensions of the human body and its 
innate capacities (in many ways this resembles ergonomics). Secondly, everyday practice allows us to 
refine our skills for coping with things and situations. Finally, Gibson’s (1977, 1986) treatment of 
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affordance reflects our embodiment and perceptions of the human world, e.g. what affords walking on, 
carrying and so forth correspond to our body’s capacities and skills. To this in his later work he adds 
such things as mail boxes afford mailing letters. This kind of affordance has been called a complex or 
cultural affordance (e.g. Turner, 2005) or a significance (Ilyenkov, 1977). Thus our bodies determine 
how we perceive and interact with the world - innate structures, basic general skills, and cultural skills. 
Merleau-Ponty includes these three dimensions of embodiment as the means by which the body makes 
the world available.  
By describing this aspect of intuitive as embodied allows us to distinguish this form of intuitiveness 
from familiarity and physical ergonomics (see also Winograd, 2000; Sharlin et al. 2004). In short, 
these various forms of tangible systems which exploit our embodiment will be treated as examples of 
“intuitiveness as embodiment”. 
3 Intuitiveness as Action-Perception Coupling 
We have considered evidence for two distinct aspects of intuitiveness and that they may be linked as 
evidenced by the recurring themes of perception and affordance. Interestingly, Kant described 
intuition (from which intuitiveness springs) as one of the basic cognitive faculties roughly equivalent 
to perception. Davidson discusses intuitiveness as follows: 
 
“The primary signification [of intuition] follows the etymology. Intuition literally means - 
seeing though the eye, visual perception: and, if we draw a distinction between intueor in 
classical usage and its near synonyms [ … ] we should say that in intueor is implied intentness 
of observation, rather than bare seeing […] If, then, we ask at this stage what Intuition is, we 
obtain as answer - the apprehension or discerning of a thing actually present to the eye; and it is 
distinguished, on the one hand, from the revival of that thing in memory …”  
Davidson (1882:304 - italics in the original) 
More recently research has presented evidence that it is more meaningful to couple action and 
perception than to treat tem separately. Work in cognitive science (e.g. Clark, 1997), robotics (e.g. 
Schaal, 1999), the study of skilled behaviour (e.g. Montagne et al., 2000) and developmental 
psychology (e.g. Thelen and Smith, 1994; Bertenthal et al., 1997) have suggested that there is close 
coupling between perception and action. For example, Bertenthal et al. (ibid) have noted that action 
and perception are being increasingly treated as being closely coupled in the regulation of coordinated 
movements. This coupling, they continue, is necessary to ensure stable and environmentally 
appropriate action patterns are produced in response to demands of the situation. So, for example, in 
moving from one location to another, we could not expect to be able to control our motor systems 
action effectively if they did not respond to incoming perceptual information. And Thelen and Smith 
have suggested that the interplay between thought and action may be so ubiquitous and so 
fundamental that all of our early knowledge is built “though the time-locked interactions of perceiving 
and acting in particular contexts” (1994: 217). 
But it was, of course, Gibson (1977, 1986) who was the first to highlight action-perception coupling 
with his work on visual perception and affordance. For Gibson, perception is not mediated by internal 
representations instead it is geared to detecting and exploiting the affordance which the environment 
provides as he put it, “We must perceive in order to move, but we must also move in order to 
perceive” (1979: 223). For example, Lederman and Klatzky (1987) have demonstrated that people 
detect the affordance of objects, such as size, texture, weight, hardness, and temperature, from haptic 
explorations. There is also substantial evidence from studies of the neural basis of perception and 
action. For example, Grèzes and Decety (2002) using positron emission tomography have shown that 
those parts of the brain responsible for motor representation are activated in response to the perception 
of the affordances of objects. They conclude that “perception of objects automatically affords actions 
that can be made towards them” (p.212). (Interestingly in reviewing the literature on the neural basis 
of affordance they note an earlier study by Jeanerod et al. (1994) who found the actions elicited by 
affordance were affected by the familiarity one had with objects.)  
However this treatment of action-perception coupling is, perhaps, a little too narrow to account for all 
aspects of intuitiveness particularly when we consider Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of the intentional 
arc. Wartofsky (1979) treats perception as an historical process rather than one which is a function of 
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the interpretation of sensory data. He argues that it is culturally acquired and is a process which 
continues to expand with additional individual or group experience. He begins, with a treatment of 
affordance (in a manner which is not dissimilar to Gibson’s account) with the recognition that 
perception is a functional aspect of the interactions between animals and their environments. He also 
observes that there is a reciprocal relationship between the animal and its environment: while the 
perceived world of the animal can be treated as a map or an image of the animals activities, the senses 
of animals themselves are shaped by the purposive interactions which the species has with the 
environment, or as he puts it, “Rather, the very forms of perceptual activity are now shaped to, and 
also help to shape an environment created by conscious human activity itself. This environment is the 
world made by praxis – nature transformed into artefact, and now embodying human intentions and 
needs in an objective way.” An example of this may be found in Goodwin and Goodwin’s (1998) 
study of operational staff at an airport. The study demonstrates how perceptions of artefacts (flight 
information displays, documentation linking flights, destinations and aircraft, the position of the 
aircraft themselves on the stand…) and their perceived properties or characteristics are shaped by the 
histories of both the personnel involved and the artefacts themselves. The Goodwins further observe 
that such perceptions are always grounded in the familiarity individuals have with given situations, 
tasks and mediating artefacts. Returning to why Nintendo’s Wii-Mote Control is intuitive – it is 
because it reflects the tight coupling between action and perception but this is in the context of 
“baseball”, “tennis” and “swordplay” the sources of which are products of our cultures. But more than 
this we see the action of our familiarity with games as providing an epistemic core to these activities. 
Swinging the Wii-Mote Control to make “contact” with an on-screen ball (or whatever) reflects the 
action-perception make up of the activity but its attractiveness, its meaningfulness as such is a product 
of our understanding, our deep familiarity with games whether real or virtual. Thus it would seem that 
we need to extend the account of action-perception coupling to include the social, cultural and historic. 
4 Discussion 
Most accounts of HCI research begin by stating a problem, describing its resolution and indicating 
how the work contributes to better design or evaluation practice. This paper is perhaps the reverse of 
this as it has begun with a given, namely that intuitiveness is desirable, is important, it underpins good 
design and so on and then argued that it may be underpinned by an (extended) account of action-
perception coupling. Given this, can we return to some of those examples of systems which claim 
intuitiveness and determine why they are so attractive? All of them, of course, involve behaviours 
such as reaching, grasping, modelling or swinging which exploits the coupling between perception and 
action. But these activities are more than a little light exercise as they are meaningful to those 
involved. Those tangible systems such as Illuminating Clay are designed to support cooperative design 
work. We might speculate that perhaps much of the appeal of the intuitiveness of interaction 
effectively frees the designers to focus on those tasks which make use of higher cognitive functions. 
Indeed the idea of “off-loading” aspects of our interaction with technology has been explored by 
Robertson et al. (1993) with their Cone Tree system which sought to switch the burden of navigating a 
file store having to use our memories to making use of visual reasoning. 
Perhaps, more generally, intuitive systems work because they make use of pre-existing or “pre-
compiled” action-perception (motor) routines and socially (and culturally / historically) acquired 
“know-how” which free us – or at least reduces the burden – of having to engage with the interacting 
rather than using to system to achieve our ends – whether it is work or fun. 
5 Further work 
Reber (1989) writing of intuitiveness notes that there is “probably no cognitive process that suffers 
from such a gap between phenomenological reality and scientific understanding. Introspectively, 
intuition is one of the most compelling and obvious cognitive processes; empirically and theoretically, 
it is one of the processes least understood by contemporary cognitive scientists”. To this discussion we 
have now added the dimensions of embodiment and familiarity as to this body of psychological 
research.  
We may also have contributed to understanding counter-intuitiveness. Having argued for a what is 
essentially a non-representational account of intuitiveness, counter-intuitiveness cannot be attributed 
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to the use of poorly constructed or executed mental models. So, faced with a counter-intuitive system 
we can speculate that (a) we automatically and unconsciously seek to make use of our familiarity with 
similar systems and (b) identify the affordances the system offers. Both activities prime effective 
prime subsequent behaviour both in terms of our “know-how” and the activation appropriate action-
perception (motor) routines. Being counter-intuitive we can reasonably expect a breakdown in the 
system’s use and thus we are faced with the cognitive burden of putting aside this priming and 
readiness to cope and tackling the system in a more considered manner. As we do not approach the use 
of systems afresh each time, it is perhaps overcoming these expectations (being primed and ready) 
which gives rise to the experience of counter-intuitiveness. 
Finally, as we now have a plausible account of the dimensions of intuitiveness and how it might work 
could this be extended to other attributes of human-computer interaction. If, for example, we were to 
recast of intuitiveness as an affordance or perhaps a cluster of affordances (corresponding to 
familiarity and embodiment) might not a similar approach to the deconstruction of other affordances? 
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